



Early Journal Content on JSTOR, Free to Anyone in the World

This article is one of nearly 500,000 scholarly works digitized and made freely available to everyone in the world by JSTOR.

Known as the Early Journal Content, this set of works include research articles, news, letters, and other writings published in more than 200 of the oldest leading academic journals. The works date from the mid-seventeenth to the early twentieth centuries.

We encourage people to read and share the Early Journal Content openly and to tell others that this resource exists. People may post this content online or redistribute in any way for non-commercial purposes.

Read more about Early Journal Content at <http://about.jstor.org/participate-jstor/individuals/early-journal-content>.

JSTOR is a digital library of academic journals, books, and primary source objects. JSTOR helps people discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content through a powerful research and teaching platform, and preserves this content for future generations. JSTOR is part of ITHAKA, a not-for-profit organization that also includes Ithaka S+R and Portico. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

one feels the need of a proportionate balance between chapters and of a careful elimination of contradictory statements, but future editions will doubtless not elicit this negative criticism. It is certain that the book will meet the requirements of a large number of small institutions where psychology is taught less from an experimental point of view than with an aim to provide the elementary student with materials for general culture.

University of Illinois

CHRISTIAN A. RUCKMICH.

Psychology, General and Applied. By HUGO MUENSTERBERG. New York and London, D. Appleton and Co., 1914. Pp. xiv + 487.

Another book which aims to present psychology less abstractly and with more regard for the problems of everyday life has appeared among the textbooks of an unusually productive year. After the introductory chapters, the volume is divided into sections on 'causal psychology,' 'purposive psychology,' and 'applied psychology.' A sharp demarcation is made between the first two, viz., between an objective, structural, and causal explanation of mental states and a subjective, meaningful, and purposive interpretation of the mental life of the self.

Under the caption of 'causal psychology,' the author comes to the conclusion that in the realm of conscious states "there is no direct causal connection possible and that it cannot be introduced by the construction of a subconscious mental machinery." The psychologist must recognize "the general postulate that every single mental state be understood as the accompaniment of a special brain process." After a discussion of the scope and methods of causal psychology, a brief account of the neural substrate is, therefore, given. The chapter on 'stimulation,' however, surprises us in that physiological stimulation does not receive so much attention as the heading would indicate; especially is this true of the lower and internal senses. 'Sensation' would probably be the more appropriate title.

The chapter on 'inhibition' gives occasion for discussing the well-known *action theory* in terms of which the facts of attention, apperception, emotion, thought, the *Aufgabe*, and the allied tendencies are here or elsewhere explained. The meaning of a perception is given by the preparation "for an adjusted line of action." This 'motor setting' is also responsible for the varying functions of the idea. But in space perceptions, the motor aspect, which Wundt emphasizes in his genetic doctrine, is held to be secondary to "the central process itself with which the motor reaction starts."

The closing chapters of this section describe personality, individual differences in the social group, and the union, submission, self-assertion, organization, and achievements of individuals. In the second section the purposive life of the individual and of social units is discussed under the separate headings of the soul, meaning, creation, and practical and ideal relations. In the last section the branches of practical, applied psychology are considered in the light of causal and of purposive psychology; but of the two, the reviewer notes the prominence of causal interpretation; in most cases the purposive aspects seem forced and unnatural and the illustrative citations seem to come from descriptive psychology.

The book is written in the author's customary readable style, but at the expense of concise and definite statement. The presentation suggests an enormous generalized fund, and an unusually comprehensive grasp of psychological data, but the absence of footnotes and

precise references often leaves the scientific reader's curiosity unsatisfied and the more mature student without the means to investigate specific problems. An extensive bibliography at the end of the book partially fulfills this need. More than any other book now before the psychological public, this volume shows the bearing of psychology on many phases of daily life and on the more closely allied disciplines. It points out in a very convincing manner that in the subject-matter of general psychology the consideration of the normative functions of the individual and of the social group has a place beside the description of the constitution of mind as a related series of psychic events. And it makes the further important point that the discussion of these two aspects must be kept rigorously separate.

University of Illinois

CHRISTIAN A. RUCKMICH.

A First Book in Psychology. By MARY WHITON CALKINS. Fourth revised edition. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1914. Pp. xxi + 428.

To pass through four editions in five years is a record equalled by very few other textbooks of psychology. It is a record indicative of an attempt on the part of the author to incorporate facts brought out in the development of the science, and, since the book stands practically alone in systematically presenting the doctrine of the *self*, the demand for new editions is further significant as a mark of the academic recognition of this interpretation.

In this edition Miss Calkins sets out to make her claim to a 'self psychology' more consistent in that the distinction between the science of mental processes as structural elements and the science of personal selves as related to objects has now been abandoned. The elements of consciousness, a term which has now become synonymous with 'personal attitude' are "constituents of all forms of the relatedness of self to its objects." Moreover, the book may be placed on the library-shelf labelled 'Behavioristic Psychology,' for, on reading some of the inserted passages we find that this relatedness can be interpreted in terms of behavior. "This somebody is not an isolated self but a self which is affected from without and which expresses itself in its behavior. In view of these facts psychology is more exactly defined as science of the self in relation to, or conscious of, its environment." But in the discussion of method, introspective analysis of experience under experimental control is still considered the main-stay of the science. Observation of behavior "belongs to ethics, to social science, and to pedagogy rather than to psychology," and is admitted only in so far as it premises self-introspection for purposes of inference.

The first five chapters deal with perceiving and imagining. These functions differ in that the first involves (1) passivity, (2) reflectively realized community of perceiving in other selves, and (3) relatedness to an object regarded as independently present. They agree in being (1) impersonal in reference to self, (2) particular in reference, and (3) chiefly sensational, rather than affective or relational, experiences. The imaginal types are given as visual, auditory, usually combined with motor-tactile, tactal-motor, and mixed; verbal types may also be classified into these groups. Perceiving and imagining may be analyzed by introspection into sensational elements, comprising eight large groups, visual, auditory, gustatory, olfactory, pressure, pain, temperature, and strain. Most of these groups contain elementary experiences of quality, intensity, and extensity. But these are